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Knick v. Township of Scott: THE SUPREME COURT’S PROPER CONCLUSION 
OVERRULING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT USING 






This Note analyzes the Pennsylvania case of Knick v. Township of 
Scott,1 appealed to the United States Supreme Court to determine whether 
a property owner’s Fifth Amendment right to compensation from 
governmental takings was dependent on the type of court in which the 
property owner’s claim was initially filed.  The Court’s discussion focused 
on precedent from the case Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,2 which demanded plaintiffs 
alleging a taking to unsuccessfully seek recourse through state law 
procedures before they would be permitted to file a federal claim.  The 
Supreme Court found the Williamson County decision had created a poorly 
reasoned exhaustion requirement that violated the Takings Clause and was 
unworkable.  In light of its findings, the Court chose not to adhere to the 
principals of stare decisis and overruled Williamson County.  
Part II of this Note will give a short summation of the facts and 
procedural history of Knick v. Township of Scott.  Part III will describe the 
background and history of the relevant law on the Fifth Amendment, the 
Takings Clause, and claims for compensation.  Part IV will explain the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the instant case.  Part V 
will argue that the outcome was rightly decided but suggests that the 
Supreme Court relied on an inappropriate analysis in coming to its decision 
and should have taken a formalistic approach using principles of 
constitutional ripeness.  Part VI will conclude that the Court in Knick v. 
Township of Scott properly overruled Williamson County despite the 
majority opinion’s lack of analysis regarding constitutional basis. 
 
    * Katherine Lingold is a December 2020 graduate of Mississippi College 
School of Law. The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Alina Ng for her 
assistance and support throughout the process of drafting this Casenote.  Additionally, 
the author would like to extend her appreciation to her friends and family for their 
encouragement and support.  
    1. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
    2. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), overruled by Knick v. 
Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2019). 
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Knick v. 
Township of Scott 
 
A. Factual Summary of Knick v. Township of Scott 
 
In December 2012, Scott Township, Pennsylvania (“Township”) 
passed an ordinance requiring “all cemeteries” to “be kept open and 
accessible to the general public during daylight hours.”3  The ordinance 
defined ‘cemetery’ as “a place or area of ground, whether contained on 
private or public property, which ha[d] been set apart for or otherwise 
utilized as a burial place for deceased human beings.”4  The ordinance gave 
“code enforcement” officers authority to “enter upon any property” in order 
to search for and locate cemeteries.5  Petitioner Rose Mary Knick (“Knick”) 
owned a plot of land in Scott Township, Pennsylvania, comprised of her 
residence and a grazing pasture for her horses and farm animals.6  Members 
of the community alleged Knick’s property also contained the site of a small 
graveyard where her neighbors’ ancestors were buried.7  In 2013, upon 
alleged authority granted by the ordinance, a Township officer entered 
Knick’s property looking for the supposed graveyard site and purportedly 
discovered a cemetery with multiple grave markers.8  Thereafter, the 
Township mailed Knick notice asserting she was in violation of the 
ordinance by failing to open the cemetery on her property to the public 
during daytime hours.9   
 
B. Procedural History of Knick v. Township of Scott 
 
Knick first filed a complaint in the Lackawanna County Court of 
Common Pleas and requested the “court declare the ordinance 
unconstitutional, void, ineffective and without force of the law; declare 
Scott Township precluded from enforcing the ordinance against her and the 
decree of Notice of Violation nullified; and grant equitable relief by special 
injunction.”10  After the action was filed, the Township made an 
 
    3. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.  
    4. Id. Private property was included because personal property had 
historically been permitted to be used for “backyard burials” for many years.  
    5. Id. 
    6. Id. 
    7. Id. 
    8. Id. 
    9. Id. 
  10. Knick v. Scott Twp., No. 3:14-CV-2223st, 2015 U.S. Dist. LESXIS 
146861, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015) aff'd sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 
310 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 
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arrangement with Knick and agreed to withdraw the violation notice and 
delay enforcement of the ordinance for the duration of state court 
proceedings.11  However, as a result of that withdrawal, the state court 
declared there was no longer an active enforcement action, the case was not 
in the “proper posture for a decision on the requested forms of relief,” and 
it was not the proper venue; and therefore, refused to rule on her action.12  
Knick then filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania and requested declaratory judgment on the 
grounds that the ordinance effected a Fifth Amendment taking without 
compensation and deprivation of rights under statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13  
In response, the Township filed a motion to dismiss her suit for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.14  The district court 
rejected the Township’s motion and proceeded to consider the claims Knick 
put forth.15  
It based a portion of its decision on the United States Supreme Court 
rule formed in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (“Williamson County”), construed as 
requiring a claimant to pursue state procedures for seeking recourse from a 
taking and for those procedures to be fruitless, before the claimant had a 
valid and ripe federal claim.16  The district court concluded that Knick failed 
to show the ordinance constituted a governmental taking as enacted, and 
therefore dismissed her takings claim without prejudice17 for failure to meet 
her burden.18  
 
Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2019), and vacated, 932 F.3d 152 (3d 
Cir. 2019). 
  11. Id. at *6. 
  12. Id. 
  13. Id. at *7-8. Her complaint under § 1983 contained five different claims: (1) 
violation of the Fourth Amendment by the Township’s search; (2) violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for failure to train officers; (3) Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims against Ferraro [code enforcement officer]; (4) First, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendment claims for vagueness, penal regulation, unreasonable 
provisions, public taking, nuisance, due process, and retaliation; and (5) declaratory 
judgment and temporary restraining order. Id. 
  14. Id. at *11. 
  15. Id. at *19-56. 
  16. Id. at *42. 
  17. See id. at *56 (explaining the district court dismissed Count IV and V 
without prejudice on the grounds that it was not certain amendment of those claims 
would be futile.  Instead, the court permitted Knick one opportunity to amend her 
complaint in order to state a claim for relief.  Conversely, the court stated Counts I-III 
were dismissed with prejudice based on the belief that it would be futile to permit 
amendments to such claims).  
  18. Id. at *32, *41-43. 
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Knick subsequently amended her complaint and filed in the 
Pennsylvania district court for a second time.19  Count II of Knick’s 
complaint contained a Takings Clause claim and alleged that the Township 
ordinance effected an uncompensated physical taking of her property in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.20  The district court noted that for a 
physical taking, the property owner must suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of their property and the government must fail to provide the 
owner just compensation.21  
In its discussion on Knick’s amended complaint, the court more 
heavily emphasized Williamson County precedent and the implied 
exhaustion requirement, evidenced by the court’s statement that “the 
federal court cannot address the merits of the claim, [until] the plaintiff 
[has] satisf[ied] the unique ripeness requirements.”22  The district court 
determined that Knick had yet to pursue recourse through Pennsylvania’s 
state law procedure – an inverse condemnation statute,23 and as a result, 
held that Knick had not satisfied the ripeness requirements.24  In response, 
Knick argued she had satisfied the state procedure requirement since she 
had initially filed a state court action before filing any federal complaint.25 
The district court discerned that, although she had filed a state action first, 
her state action had not included a petition to initiate the process for seeking 
compensation, and thus failed to satisfy Williamson County requirements.26 
Consequently, the court dismissed Knick’s amended complaint without 
prejudice.27  
 
  19. Knick v. Scott Twp., No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220, 
at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d 
Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019), vacated and remanded, 932 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2019); See id. at *10-21 
(explaining Count I alleged warrantless search previously dismissed with prejudice. 
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Count I with prejudice again.  Count II included 
a claim for a Fourth Amendment seizure violation which was already discussed and 
dismissed with prejudice in the prior litigation, resulting in the court dismissing the 
seizure claim with prejudice a second time.  Count III sought declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief, but the court declined to grant either since Knick’s takings claim was 
not ripe for consideration). 
  20. Id. at *11. 
  21. Id. at *11-12. 
  22. Id. at *12-13. 
  23. An inverse-condemnation proceeding is a state law action against a local or 
state government entity for compensation of property taken. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 
263 F.3d 286 at *290 (3d Cir. 2001).   
  24. Knick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220 at *18 
  25. Id. at *16-18. 
  26. Id. 
  27. Id. at *20. 
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Knick appealed the district court’s decision, on the grounds that the 
court erred in requiring her to exhaust state-law remedies for 
compensation.28  Knick maintained her argument that the ordinance 
resulted in an uncompensated taking by mandating she open her land to the 
public and to Township officers.29  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit cited Williamson County precedent as well, and asserted 
that plaintiffs needed to abide by the two requirements imposed in 
Williamson County: the finality rule and the state-procedure exhaustion 
requirement.30  Interestingly, the court of appeals stated in a footnote that 
Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement “is not a ‘true’ exhaustion 
requirement, but merely addresses a unique aspect of just compensation 
takings claims.”31  While defendant Township contended that Knick failed 
to use inverse-condemnation procedures and failed to satisfy the exhaustion 
requirement, Knick proclaimed she was not required to pursue inverse-
condemnation proceedings.32  Knick argued: her facial33 takings claim was 
exempt from exhaustion; she had complied with Williamson County by 
suing for relief in state court unsuccessfully; and in the interest of 
efficiency, that the court should overlook the prudential requirements.34  
In its discussion, the court of appeals specified one single situation 
which excused a plaintiff from pursuing state-law exhaustion requirements: 
if the plaintiff challenged the basis for the validity of an act of taking, such 
as violating due process, then denial of compensation was immaterial to a 
ripeness determination and Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement 
did not apply.35  The claims Knick had included in her amended complaint 
that were presented to the court of appeals were subject to the requirements 
however, because they were claims for compensation, not claims 
 
  28. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 316-18 (3d Cir. 
2017), vacated. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), and 
remanded, 932 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2019). 
  29. Id. at 323. 
  30. Id. 
  31. Id. n.10. 
  32. Id. at 323-25. 
  33. See id. at 324-25 (explaining the court of appeals belief that the Supreme 
Court has used the word “facial” in two ways: (1) “facial taking,” and (2) “facial 
challenge.”  A “facial taking” is a type of taking in which the simple act of enacting a 
statute effectuates a taking.  Nonetheless, a “facial taking” is not automatically 
considered unconstitutional; rather, it gives rise to an entity’s constitutionally based 
obligation to compensate the property owner.  On the other hand, a “facial challenge” 
attempts to invalidate the ordinance claimed to constitute a taking, instead of providing 
compensation). 
  34. Id. at 323. 
  35. Id. at 325-26. 
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challenging the validity of the Township’s taking.36  Similar to the district 
court’s holding, the court of appeals disagreed with Knick’s compliance 
argument and found her state action had not included a request for 
compensation and had not satisfied the exhaustion requirements. 37 
Lastly, Knick argued permitting her claims to proceed without 
returning to state court for the mere purpose of satisfying Williamson 
County’s requirements would be more efficient and would avoid potential 
piecemeal litigation.38  Unconvinced, the court of appeals determined the 
only claim that remained in Knick’s complaint was her just compensation 
claim, which showed no risk of piecemeal litigation, did not indicate any 
exceptional circumstance interfered with Knick’s ability to pursue inverse-
condemnation proceedings, and had not identified any change in applicable 
law.39  It declared that exemptions to the requirements should only be 
granted in narrow circumstances and that state courts are better equipped to 
calculate the amount of compensation owed.40  The court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal of Knick’s amended complaint, even though it was 
suspicious of the ordinance’s constitutionality, specifically stating “it is 
difficult to imagine a broader authorization to conduct searches of privately 
owned property.”41  
Knick proceeded to appeal the decision dismissing her complaint to 
the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to review 
Williamson County and reevaluate the exhaustion requirement imposed.42 
The Supreme Court found that the government violated the self-executing 
Takings Clause at the exact moment it took property; therefore, the property 
owner had grounds for a federal takings claim at the moment of the taking.43 
As a result, the Court overruled the Williamson County exhaustion 
requirement and held that property owners seeking compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment may bring federal claims, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims, at the time of the taking.44  
 
  36. Id. at 326. 
  37. Id. at 327. 
  38. Id. at 328. 
  39. Id. 
  40. Id. at 327-28. 
  41. Id. at 322, 328.  
  42. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. at 2169. 
  43. Id. at 2179. 
  44. Id. The Supreme Court also held a government entity violates the self-
executing Takings Clause at the exact moment it takes property without giving the 
property owner compensation; and found respondents read prior opinions too broadly 
stating the Takings Clause does not stipulate compensation must in fact be paid prior to 
the taking, and instead, only requires “a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for 
obtaining compensation after a taking” (citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. 
Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295. (1890)). Id. at 2166.  
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW ON TAKINGS AND THE 
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
 
A. The Ripeness Doctrine 
 
Courts apply the “ripeness” doctrine to a multitude of claims.45  As 
a general rule, the ripeness doctrine prevents a court from ruling on certain 
matters, otherwise known as “unripe” matters, that for one reason or 
another are not ready for review yet or that contain an injury to the plaintiff 
considered too speculative.46   Courts have formed two main classifications 
of “ripeness” related to property takings claims: constitutional command 
ripeness and prudential ripeness.47  
Constitutional command ripeness, as it pertains to the “Williamson 
County ripeness puzzle” and just compensation, has been further classified 
into two subcategories based on where the command comes from: 
“constitutional command grounded in Article III’s case-or-controversy 
limitation,” and “constitutional command grounded in the Fifth 
Amendment.”48  Constitutional ripeness under Article III holds that the 
statutory language of Article III “limits federal court jurisdiction to cases 
and controversies… for resolution of concrete and ‘fully crystalized’ 
disputes.”49  Similarly, “because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings 
without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just 
compensation has been denied,” meaning a claim is not ripe until 
compensation has been intentionally denied.50  In other words, for 
constitutional ripeness under the Fifth Amendment, compensation is 
portrayed as a substantive element of a federal takings claim.51 
Conversely, prudential ripeness rests “as a principle grounded in 
policy considerations,” based on the idea that some matters “are more 
appropriately resolved in another forum” or “will be better decided later.”52 
Prudential ripeness has been deemed non-jurisdictional and susceptible to 
exceptions consistent with policy considerations recognized by courts; for 
instance, creating an exception “to enhance the accuracy of [a court’s] 
decisions and to avoid [courts from] becoming embroiled in adjudications 
 
  45. Katherine Mims Crocker, A PRUDENTIAL TAKE ON A PRUDENTIAL 
TAKINGS DOCTRINE, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 39, 40 (2018). 
  46. Id.; Katherine Mims Crocker, JUSTIFYING A PRUDENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE 
WILLIAMSON COUNTY RIPENESS PUZZLE, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 163, 174 (2014). 
  47. Crocker, supra Note 45 at 40. 
  48. Id. 
  49. Id. 
  50. Id. 
  51. Id. 
  52. Id. 
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that later may turn out to be unnecessary.”53  Relevant to the compensation 
prong, federalism concerns such as a state court’s ability to decide federal 
constitutional claims or a state court’s extensive experience and knowledge 
with property disputes, are pertinent grounds for consideration of prudential 
ripeness.54 
 
B. Imposition of the Exhaustion Requirement and Williamson County 
 
The takings claim exhaustion requirement was first recognized in 
relation to Williamson County, but the Supreme Court had extensively 
considered whether takings claims should include exhaustion requirements 
three years prior in Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida (“Patsy”).55  
Background on the Court’s opinion in Patsy is important because its 
analysis was based on constitutional factors and highlighted a test for 
determining whether courts were allowed to impose exhaustion 
requirements.  In Patsy, plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against her 
employer in federal court and alleged she had been denied employment 
opportunities, but the court dismissed her claim for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.56  Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court, 
where the issue posed was whether exhausting administrative remedies was 
required prior to filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal action.57  The Court 
initially rejected the theory that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should impose 
exhaustion requirements on administrative remedies, based on the federal 
court’s duty to protect constitutional rights.58  Nonetheless, the Court 
proceeded to review the lower courts’ rationale and analyzed reversal of the 
exhaustion requirement using two factors: interpretation of the statute’s 
meaning when compared to legislative history and whether congressional 
intent was consistent with overruling the exhaustion requirement.59    
The Supreme Court found legislative history granted Congress 
complete authority to impose exhaustion requirements on federal claims 
and granted courts only a very limited authority to impose exhaustion 
requirements under narrow circumstances.60  However, the courts had been 
vested with the authority to decide the limits of those requirements.61  The 
Court determined congressional intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was prefaced 
 
  53. Crocker, supra Note 45, at 44; Crocker, supra Note 46 at 174. 
  54. Crocker, supra Note 45, at 45. 
  55. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982). 
  56. Id. at 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557-58.  
  57. Id. at 498-500. 
  58. Id. at 500-01. 
  59. Id. at 501-02. 
  60. Id. 
  61. Id. 
132 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:1 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and concluded the purpose of that Act was 
to balance the protection of citizens’ federal rights with the exercise of state 
powers.62 Congressional intent indicated Congress was skeptical of whether 
state courts were fairly and constitutionally protecting people’s rights and 
if not, Congress wanted to provide relief through access to less prejudicial 
federal courts.63 Consequently, the Patsy Supreme Court held the history 
underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not support the exhaustion requirement 
implemented by the lower courts, especially if the requirement had 
potential to prevent a plaintiff from escaping prejudice, deprivation of 
rights, or threats.64 
In Williamson County, respondent was a residential building 
developer and petitioner was the Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission (“Commission”).65  Under Tennessee law, in order for a 
developer to begin construction, their building plans needed the 
Commission’s approval and approval was contingent on compliance with 
the zoning ordinances and land regulations.66  The Commission 
implemented new zoning ordinances and new regulations in 1973, and then 
modified the zoning ordinances shortly thereafter in 1977.67 
Notably, the initial building plans for the plot of land at issue were 
done by respondent’s predecessor-in-interest (“developer”) and respondent 
had not actually acquired the property until 1981.68  Developer submitted 
an initial plan with proposed construction to the Commission in 1973.69  The 
Commission approved the initial plan and construction promptly began.70 
The initial plan was subsequently submitted for renewal by developer each 
year from 1974 to 1977 and was approved by the Commission all four 
times.71  When the plan was submitted for renewal in 1978 after the 
ordinances had been modified, the Commission decided to continue 
applying the original 1973 ordinances rather than the modified ordinances 
 
  62. Id. at 502-04. 
  63. Id. at 504-06. 
  64. Id. at 502-07; See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding 42 U.S.C § 1983 legislation was 
enacted to prevent prejudice, passion, neglect, and intolerance in state courts by allowing 
plaintiffs into federal court, and ruling that two necessary elements of a § 1983 claim 
were that the alleged act was committed while defendant acted under state law and that 
the plaintiff was deprived of a Constitutional right because of defendant’s action). 
  65. Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. at 175, overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
  66. Id. at 177. 
  67. Id. at 178-79. 
  68. Id. at 177, 181. 
  69. Id. at 177. 
  70. Id. 
  71. Id. at 178. 
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and renewed approval.72  Amidst the 1979 process for renewal, the 
Commission revoked its prior decision and instructed the 1977 modified 
ordinances to be applied instead.73  It stated the initial plan had multiple 
survey errors, included land the state had since condemned between 1973 
and 1980, and failed to plan out acreage marked ‘reserved.’74  The 
Commission therefore mandated that developer submit a revised initial plan 
according to the 1977 ordinances.75  An updated plan was then submitted 
by developer in 1980, but the Commission purportedly found eight 
problems and refused to grant approval.76   
After the 1980 rejection, respondent obtained ownership of the land 
through foreclosure and then submitted two development plans to the 
Commission.77  One plan was identical to the developer’s 1973 initial plan, 
and the second was akin to the developer’s 1980 rejected plan but included 
corrections and updates.78  Despite the corrections, the Commission refused 
to approve either of respondent’s plans, which lead respondent to sue the 
Commission in federal court on the grounds that the zoning ordinances and 
regulations effected a ‘taking’ of property.79   
At trial, the jury found that the Commission had denied respondent 
of economically viable use of his land and that the just compensation clause 
had been violated.80  The court disagreed with the jury, however, finding 
that respondent was only temporarily deprived of use and thus, concluded 
no taking had occurred yet. 81  Upon its findings, the court instructed 
respondent to re-submit his plans and ordered the Commission to re-
evaluate them based on the 1973 ordinances.82  Respondent disregarded the 
court’s order and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court before re-
submitting his plans.83  
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether federal, state, and 
local governments were required to compensate a property owner for an 
alleged taking when the land was ‘taken’ in a temporary manner by 
government regulations.84  The Commission argued a Fifth Amendment 
 
  72. Id.  
  73. Id. at 178-179. 
  74. Id. at 179. 
  75. Id. 
  76. Id. at 179-80. 
  77. Id. at 181. 
  78. Id. 
  79. Id. at 181-82. 
  80. Id. at 182-83. 
  81. Id. at 183. 
  82. Id. 
  83. Id. at 183-84. 
  84. Id. at 185. 
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‘taking’ could not be interpreted to include government regulations.85  After 
examination, the Court concluded respondent’s claim indicated a lack of 
finality, since respondent had yet to receive a final decision on the status of 
his application under the 1973 ordinances or seek any variances.86 
Therefore, the Court ruled respondent’s claim premature and not ripe for 
review.87 
Despite the fact that the Court had already ruled respondent’s claim 
premature for lack of finality, the Court needlessly continued its 
examination.88   The Supreme Court declared that the Fifth Amendment did 
not prohibit the taking of property altogether, rather, only prohibited taking 
property without providing the owner just compensation.89  It asserted that 
under the Fifth Amendment, payment for just compensation was not 
required prior to or at the time of the taking, rather only a reasonable, 
certain, and adequate provision for a property owner to acquire 
compensation was required.90  The Court opined that a landowner did not 
have a Fifth Amendment ‘takings’ claim against a state if the state had 
implemented a sufficient procedure to seek compensation and use of those 
procedures would result in just compensation.91  In circumstances where 
zoning ordinances have effected a ‘taking,’ a Tennessee statute provided 
landowners the opportunity to seek just compensation through an inverse 
condemnation action.92  The Court found that Tennessee provided 
 
  85. Id. The Commission instead argued that it was a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation and stated due process violations do not require “just compensation.”  They 
claimed a regulation which resulted in property appropriation for public use should be 
viewed as violating due process rights since it is equivalent to government police powers 
effecting a result only allowed by use of eminent domain powers. Id.  
  86. Id. at 186-94.; Furthermore, since the Court held respondent’s claim was 
premature, the Court was prevented from answering the question presented. Id. 
  87. Id. 
  88. Id. at 200. 
  89. Id. at 194. 
  90. Id. at 194-95.; See also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 
(1890) (holding that the Constitution did not explicitly state compensation was required 
to be paid in advance and interpreted the Takings Clause to indicate a property could not 
be taken or touched until a reasonable, certain and adequate procedure was in place for a 
property owner to obtain compensation); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft, 
224 U.S. 290 (1912) (holding that unless there was a specific constitutional provision 
which explicitly mandated compensation be given first, all that was required was a 
reasonable, just and prompt provision for the property owner to seek compensation); 
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not grant 
the property owner the right to payment prior to the taking); Yearsley v. W.A. Ross 
Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not give the 
property owner the right to advanced compensation, especially when a statute allocating 
a simple and sufficient remedy existed). 
  91. Id. at 195. 
  92. Id. at 196.  
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respondent the ability to file an inverse condemnation action against the 
Commission, but respondent had not used the procedure or shown that it 
was unavailable or inadequate.93  Thus, it concluded respondent’s ‘takings’ 
claim was also premature and unripe for failure to use state procedures to 
obtain compensation first, and ruled respondent’s claim further precluded.94 
The consequence of Williamson County’s holding was the implied creation 
of a state-litigation exhaustion requirement for takings plaintiffs.95 
Although the Williamson County Supreme Court had, in effect, imposed a 
takings claim exhaustion requirement, the Court had not specifically called 
it or referred to it as such.96 
 
C. Evolvement of the Takings Clause and Exhaustion Requirement 
 
After Williamson County was decided, the Supreme Court referred 
to the state-litigation exhaustion requirement in the context of the ripeness 
doctrine in Lucas v. South Carolina.97  Plaintiff in that case owned 
beachfront property in South Carolina that he planned to build homes on, 
but South Carolina Coastal Council enacted a statute which prevented him 
from building on his property.98  Plaintiff filed a takings claim against the 
council and alleged the statute effected a taking of property without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.99  In 
the process of concluding that the statute effected a taking of plaintiff’s 
property for loss of economically beneficial use, the Supreme Court stated 
the Williamson County requirements “went only to the prudential ‘ripeness’ 
of” the claim.100  However, the Court had not elaborated any further as to 
why it declared the requirements prudential.101  
The Supreme Court then cited the Williamson County exhaustion 
requirement in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, where it called 
the requirements “prudential hurdles.”102  Opposite of Lucas, the Suitum 
 
  93. Id. at 196-97. See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (affirming that advanced 
compensation was not required prior to a taking, ruling in opposition of Williamson 
County, and stating that an immediate constitutional claim for a taking has arisen at the 
time of a taking because the Constitution required just compensation and there was an 
implied agreement to pay in the choice to act under the Takings Clause).   
  94. Id. at 200. 
  95. Id. 
  96. Id. 
  97. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
  98. Id. at 1008. 
  99. Id. at 1009. 
100. Id. at 1013. 
101. Id.  
102. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-734 (1997). 
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Court explained that the “compensation hurdle” which required exhaustion 
“stems from the Fifth Amendment's provison that only takings without ‘just 
compensation’ infringe that Amendment.”103  Nonetheless, the Court’s 
holding in Suitum was decided on finality grounds and had not warranted 
further discussion on compensation.104   
Subsequently, the Supreme Court encountered Williamson County’s 
exhaustion requirement in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San 
Francisco, California where it addressed whether a federal court was 
allowed to create a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause exception to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.105  Interestingly, though the Court had referred to 
the exhaustion requirement as ‘prudential’ in prior cases, it omitted any 
consideration of the ripeness doctrine in San Remo. Petitioners owned the 
San Remo Hotel (“Hotel”) in San Francisco and had leased it to be run and 
operated as a bed and breakfast inn.106  Years after petitioners bought the 
hotel, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (“Board”) enacted an 
ordinance to regulate conversions of residential hotel units into tourist 
units.107  The ordinance required conversion permits and stated a permit 
would only be given for building new units, restoring old units, or when the 
builder paid the city an ‘in lieu’ fee.108  When petitioners submitted an 
application for a conversion permit, the Board approved their permit, but 
conditioned approval on payment of a hefty ‘in lieu’ fee.109  Petitioners then 
filed an action against the Board in the federal district court and asserted 
claims under both federal and state law on the grounds that the ordinance 
effected a ‘taking’ as applied to their hotel, which the Board responded to 
by filing for summary judgment.110   
The district court determined petitioners’ claims were premature 
and granted the Board’s summary judgment motion.111  Petitioners 
appealed and specifically asked the court of appeals to only rule on the issue 
of whether the claims were premature and not to rule on their substantive 
federal claims, since those federal claims would become moot if the case 
moved to state court.112  The court agreed, and then affirmed the lower 




105. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 
125 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (2005). 
106. Id. at 327-28 
107. Id. at 328. 
108. Id.   
109. Id. at 328-29. 
110. Id. at 330. 
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2021] KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT 137 
failure to use state inverse condemnation proceedings.113  However, the 
court also granted petitioners the ability to raise their federal claims in 
federal court at a later time, but stipulated they had to specifically reserve 
that right in state court.114   
Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint in state court which listed 
additional claims not included in their initial federal complaint and the court 
dismissed the complaint entirely.115  Upon further examination, the state 
court found that the additional claims were similar in structure to the federal 
claims and had not been specifically reserved by petitioners like the federal 
court of appeals had instructed.116  Therefore, the state court deduced that it 
had in fact handed down a judgment on petitioners’ federal claims 
simultaneously with their state claims.117  Petitioners appealed the decision 
to the California Supreme Court, but the decision to dismiss the complaint 
was upheld.118  Rather than appeal the state court decision to the United 
States Supreme Court, petitioners went back to the federal district court and 
amended their initial federal complaint.119  The district court subsequently 
held that petitioners’ claims were barred by issue preclusion on the grounds 
that their complaint contained claims previously adjudicated in state 
court.120  
Essentially, petitioners’ claims were dismissed after filing in federal 
court, but petitioners were also granted the ability to reserve those claims 
during the required state proceedings.121  Nonetheless, after petitioners 
proceeded through state court and later filed in federal court, their claims 
were barred on the grounds of issue preclusion.122  Petitioners appealed to 
the Supreme Court and argued that federal courts should give zero 
deference to state court decisions regarding takings claims in order to ensure 
decisions on the merits.123  They based their argument on the fact that the 
Court in Williamson County held a property owner could not even attempt 
to get into federal court until compensation had been denied through state 
procedures.124   
 
113. Id. at 330-31. 
114. Id. at 331. 
115. Id. at 332. 
116. Id. at 331. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 331-32. 
119. Id. at 334. 
120. Id. at 335. 
121. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 
125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). 
122. Id. at 334. 
123. Id. at 338. 
124. Id. at 341-42. 
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The Supreme Court noted that courts can only make a departure 
from traditional rules of preclusion, such as a Takings Clause exception 
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, when Congress specifically stated or 
indicated it was allowed.125  Further, the Court disagreed with petitioners’ 
argument regarding entry into federal court and stated that not all takings 
plaintiffs deserved a day in federal court.126  It found Congress had not 
given any authority for departure from preclusion rules for takings actions, 
and therefore, ruled federal courts were not allowed to disregard the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause for the sole purpose of ensuring every takings 
plaintiff had a chance in federal court.127  Additionally, the Court 
determined that petitioners could have refrained from including language 
resembling their federal claims in their state action and prevented 
preclusion issues, but they failed to do so.128 For these reasons, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.129  San Remo Hotel 
reaffirmed the Williamson County exhaustion requirement and denied that 
such exhaustion requirement created a catch-twenty-two preclusion issue 
in that case, though it was denied inadvertently without using “ripeness” 
verbiage.130   
On the contrary, the concurring opinion written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, did specifically discuss the ripeness doctrine.131  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted that the Williamson County Court had “purported to 
interpret the Fifth Amendment in divining this state-litigation 
requirement,” but “recently, we have referred to it as merely a prudential 
requirement.”132  He went further and explained it was “not obvious that 
either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all 
state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal takings 
claim,” and cited Patsy’s holding that concluded exhaustion was not 
required for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.133  
Classification of Williamson County’s requirement then evolved 
more in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, where the Supreme Court declared that the 
compensation prong of takings claims was non-jurisdictional.134  In that 
 
125. Id. at 344-45. 
126. Id. at 336-39. 
127. Id. at 344-45.  
128. Id. at 345-46. 
129. Id. at 342-47. 
130. Id. at 341-47. 
131. Id. at 348-49. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
132. Id.  
133. Id. 
134. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 
702, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010). 
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case, the issue before the Court was whether judicial action could violate 
the Takings Clause wherein respondents argued that petitioner’s takings 
claim was unripe because petitioner had not attempted to seek recourse 
through state procedures and thus, had not satisfied the requirements of 
Williamson County.135  The Court disagreed with respondents and held that 
it could waive both the finality and exhaustion requirements “since neither 
is jurisdictional,” and ultimately concluded there had not been a taking.136    
The idea of applying jurisdiction principles to the exhaustion 
requirement was noted again in Horne v. Department of Agriculture.137 
Although the main issue there revolved around the Tucker Act, the 
Supreme Court stated “a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is 
clear that the Government has both taken property and denied just 
compensation. Although we often refer to this consideration as ‘prudential 
ripeness,’ we have recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, 
jurisdictional.”138  Therefore, as of the time Knick was brought in front of 
the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court appeared to interpret Williamson 
County’s exhaustion requirement as a prudential ripeness factor but had yet 







135. Id. at 727-29. 
136. Id. at 729. 
137. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 186 L. Ed. 2d 69 
(2013). 
138. Id. at 525-26. Additionally, a federal district court was met with a removal 
situation in 2014 which narrowed the application of the exhaustion requirement for 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 takings claims when defendants motioned for removal. Athanasiou v. 
Town of Westhampton, 30 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D. Mass. 2014). In Athanasiou v. Town of 
Westhampton, plaintiffs filed their action in state court first, in Massachusetts Superior 
Court, as required under Williamson County, and combined a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
takings claim with state claims. Id. at 86-87. Defendants then successfully motioned to 
remove the case to federal court. Id. After the case was removed to the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, defendants filed to dismiss the case 
entirely, arguing plaintiffs had failed to meet Williamson County exhaustion 
requirements. Id. at 87. Plaintiffs vehemently opposed dismissal, insisting that they 
attempted to meet exhaustion requirements, but defendants had interfered by filing a 
removal motion and were the direct cause of the failure to exhaust state law 
requirements. Id. The district court agreed and held defendant’s removal of the 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim to federal court acted as a waiver of the state law exhaustion requirement. 
Id. at 88-89. The district court reasoned that if it had held otherwise, defendants would be 
able to manipulate litigation and plaintiffs would be subjected to undue hardship. Id.  
139. Williamson Cty, 473 U.S. at 727-29. 
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IV. INSTANT CASE: Knick v. Township of Scott 
 
A. Majority Opinion 
 
The ruling handed down by the United States Supreme Court 
ultimately addressed whether consequences of Williamson County 
necessitated overruling precedent or if principals of stare decisis compelled 
adherence to Williamson County precedent. 140  To make a determination 
on that issue, the Court initially considered the Fifth Amendment and 
clarified whether a plaintiff whose property was taken by governmental 
action was required to pursue recourse through state procedures before the 
property owner had standing to bring a federal claim. 141  
 
1. Merits of the Williamson County Holding  
 
The Supreme Court first considered the merits of Williamson 
County, specifically when a federal claim was vested, when an exhaustion 
requirement was formed, and when compensation needed to be paid.142  The 
Court held that a property owner’s federal claim for a taking was vested at 
the moment the taking occurred and could be immediately filed in federal 
court.143  It initially looked to the language of the Takings Clause and 
distinguished that the clause merely said “without just compensation,” and 
did not include the phrase “without an available procedure that will result 
in compensation.”144  The Court interpreted the clause’s statutory language 
to mean a property owner was deprived of a constitutional right when they 
were without payment.145  Therefore, a federal claim, such as a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claim, was permitted to be filed in federal court when the government 
took property without the property owner receiving payment, regardless of 
any state law procedures the might have been available for recourse.146   
Next, the Court referenced the Tucker Act, a federal statute which 
granted the right to file a claim for compensation from takings committed 
by the United States government.147  The Court explained case law that 
interpreted the Act defined “the act of taking” as “the event which gives 
 
140. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169, 2177, 204 L. 
Ed. 2d 558 (2019). 
141. Id. at 2168.  
142. Id. at 2169-77. 
143. Id. at 2170. 
144. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170, 204 L. Ed. 2d 
558 (2019). 
145. Id. at 2170, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558. 
146. Id.   
147. Id.   
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rise to the claim for compensation.”148  From this, the Court deduced that 
when the United States government committed a taking, the property 
owner’s claim for compensation that followed undoubtedly fell under the 
Tucker Act federal statute, and thus, the claim for compensation 
automatically was deemed based on the Constitution and within the federal 
court’s jurisdiction.149  
The Court continued its analysis and referenced Jacobs, which held 
that when compensation is paid to the property owner at a later time after 
the taking had occurred, the amount of compensation must equal the same 
amount as if the property owner had been paid at the time of taking, 
including interest.150  It stated that Jacobs’ holding indicated the right to 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment was ripe at the moment the act 
of taking was committed, regardless of any remedial measures the property 
owner had after the taking occurred.151  The Court’s opinion in Knick 
declared the Jacobs holding was analogous and the same principles applied 
to state and local government takings.152  The Fifth Amendment was the 
tool that actually granted the constitutional right to just compensation for a 
taking, but statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a vehicle that provided a property 
owner with a procedure to invoke that right.153  As compared to Jacobs, 
since the right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment was ripe at the 
moment of a taking, if the property owner had not received compensation 
as of the time of taking, then the property owner was deprived of the 
constitutional right to compensation at that time.154  This meant a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 deprivation of rights claim was simultaneously ripe at the time the 
taking occurred and was unencumbered by state procedures for obtaining 
compensation.155  Specifically, the Court held that a state law inverse 
condemnation action or state law otherwise providing a method for 
recourse, did not impact the property owner’s right to federal constitutional 
claims.156  The Court found that Williamson County’s view of the Takings 
Clause was in direct contravention to Jacobs.157  Williamson County had 
concluded that the existence of a state law which granted just compensation 
disqualified a property owner’s constitutional right to a federal claim and 
 
148. Id.   
149. Id.   
150. Id. at 2170-72. 
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delayed that right until the owner had exhausted use of the state 
procedures.158  
To further support its ruling, the Supreme Court cited First English 
which had referred to the Takings Clause as having a “self-executing 
character,” meaning as soon as the taking occurred, the property owner was 
vested with a constitutional claim for just compensation.159  Thus, on the 
question of when a claim vested, the Court concluded property owners were 
entitled to file a federal claim for deprivation of the right to compensation 
at the point the taking occurred.160   
Next, in considering when the exhaustion requirement was formed, 
the Supreme Court determined that Williamson County imposed the 
exhaustion requirement when it ordered property owners to exhaust state 
procedures for compensation as a pre-requisite to filing in federal court.161 
The Williamson County Court relied on interpretation of the Takings Clause 
for its ruling, and formed such interpretation based on Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co. (“Monsanto”),162 which led the Supreme Court to review 
Monsanto.163  The Court was not fond of Williamson County’s analogy and 
stated the Monsanto case was not a takings claim for just compensation, 
rather, it involved a takings claim which sought injunction of a federal 
statute.164  The Monsanto Court stated that procedures for compensation 
were available for plaintiff and held that equitable relief, such as an 
injunction, did not apply to a takings claim when the property owner could 
bring an action for just compensation.165  The Knick Court agreed with 
Monsanto on that point, finding precedent stated the availability of 
monetary relief prevented equitable relief.166 
The Monsanto Court further stated that if procedures led to just 
compensation, then no taking had occurred and the property owner did not 
have a takings claim against the government.167  The Knick Court disagreed 
with the Monsanto Court’s contention that compensation negated the 
existence of a takings claim and explained that compensation did not negate 
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162. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
815 (1984).  
163. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2173-74 (2019). 
164. Id. at 2173. 
165. Id. 
166. Id.   
167. Id.   
2021] KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT 143 
the claim, but instead remedied the takings claim once it had been paid to 
the property owner.168  
The Williamson County Court also referenced Monsanto in an 
attempt to make a comparison in which it alleged that only once a property 
owner whose property had been ‘taken’ by the United States government 
had employed the Tucker Act procedures, had a federal takings claim fully 
matured.169  The Court did not agree and clarified that an action for just 
compensation under the Tucker Act was in fact a Fifth Amendment takings 
claim, not a separate pre-requisite; and thus, once a property owner was 
denied compensation under the Tucker Act, there was nowhere else to 
turn.170  Additionally, the it emphasized that only Congress had the power 
to implement exhaustion requirements, not states.171  
The Knick Court accredited a portion of the hapless ruling made in 
Williamson County to the circumstances surrounding the decision and 
explained that it was possible the Court failed to reasonably analyze the 
logic underlying the state litigation requirement or the potential impacts.172 
It suggested that Williamson County should have been decided solely on the 
grounds that the property owner brought suit before a final decision had 
been made regarding a taking by government regulations and the Court 
should not have continued to consider the effect of state procedures or any 
other basis.173 
The Supreme Court’s third consideration on the merits of 
Williamson County addressed whether compensation must be paid prior to 
the act of taking.174  Respondent in the instant case argued that takings 
which are initially uncompensated, but which allow compensation at a later 
point, are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment at the point taking 
occurs.175  However, the Court contended the cases Respondent cited in 
support of its argument included claims for injunctive relief and deemed 
those cases inapplicable, on the grounds that an equitable remedy as such 
could not be used because an action for monetary compensation was 
 
168. Id.   
169. Id. at 2174.  
170. Id.  
171. Id. at 2173. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by 
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available.176  It also noted that the fact that a property owner was prohibited 
from injunctive relief at the time of taking did not also mean that the 
Takings Clause had not been violated at that time.177  
The Knick Court then dove into the history of the Takings Clause 
and found the Framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the federal 
government from taking private property without providing payment for 
said property.178  It stressed that the Framers did not intend for the 
government to permissibly take possession of property while the owner 
awaited future compensation.179   The Court concluded Williamson County 
had made its ruling incorrectly.180  When the government, whether federal 
or local, had taken property and failed to compensate the property owner, 
the government violated the Takings Clause and the property owner was 
entitled to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as of the time of taking.181 
Since the Court determined the Takings Clause and the Fifth Amendment 
were concurrently violated at the time property was taken, a property owner 
was permitted to file a federal claim in pursuit of a remedy without waiting 
for judgment in a state action.182  The Supreme Court held the Williamson 
County Court erred in holding otherwise.183   
 
2. Adhering to or Departing from Stare Decisis 
 
The Supreme Court in Knick explained that the stare decisis 
doctrine generally meant the Court should rule in favor of precedent, and 
was premised on the theory that it was usually more pertinent to settle the 
applicable rule of law than to ensure it was settled correctly.184  The Court 
noted the doctrine was given the least deference when applied to holdings 
that interpreted a portion of the Constitution because those holdings could 
only be altered by a Supreme Court decision or a constitutional 
amendment.185  This was the case with the Williamson County decision, as 
it had interpreted the Fifth Amendment.186  The majority opinion identified 
four factors it evaluated for assessing whether overruling a decision was 
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established rule, if it was consistent with related decisions, and the level of 
reliance on the decision.187  It concluded all four factors weighed in favor 
of overruling Williamson County and against stare decisis.188   
For the first factor, the Court held the reasoning behind Williamson 
County was extremely baseless and had conflicted with prior rulings on 
takings claims.189  It also declared Williamson County Court’s significant 
conclusion, which stated a property owner had a federal action for a takings 
claim only once they had been denied compensation in a state law action, 
had come from superfluous language in the Monsanto decision.190  The 
Court further stated the Williamson County decision disregarded Jacobs 
and a multitude of other cases that held a right to compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment was vested in a property owner at the time the taking 
occurred.191 
Regarding the second factor, the Williamson County decision was 
found especially unworkable after San Remo,192 where the decision had a 
preclusive effect and prevented property owners from bringing a federal 
action for compensation after rejection in state court.193  The consequence 
of San Remo was significant considering the potential multitude of property 
owners that would be prevented from litigating a federal takings claim 
provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.194  The majority opinion then addressed 
the dissent’s contention that an “enhanced” form of stare decisis should 
have been applied to Williamson County and then Congress could have 
amended the Full Faith and Credit Clause to remove the preclusion trap 
issue seen in San Remo.195  The majority opinion rebutted this by pointing 
out that even if Congress had made such an amendment, property owners 
with takings claims still would have been erroneously required to file a state 
action for compensation before filing any federal action under Williamson 
County.196  
Under the third factor, the Court explicitly noted that the decision 
of Williamson County had not been very consistent upon finding the 
justification for Williamson County’s ruling had varied over the previous 
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thirty (30) years and continued to evolve, for example some courts had 
recast the requirement as prudential.197  
Lastly, in addressing the fourth factor, the Supreme Court found no 
reliance interests since the weight of stare decisis was reduced when dealing 
with rulings that had no relevance to issues of lawful behavior.198  The Court 
stated the government would not be subjected to new liability as a result of 
overruling Williamson County, rather the new rule merely gave property 
owners the option of filing federal claims for takings they would have 
otherwise had to file in state court as inverse condemnation actions.199  
After the Knick majority opinion fully analyzed both questions 
posed on appeal, the Court overruled Williamson County and the state 
litigation exhaustion requirement imposed within it.200  The Court stipulated 
that a property owner was permitted to file a federal takings action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 at the time the taking occurred and deprived the owner of 
compensation, without first having to pursue remedies through the state 
courts.201  
 
B. Concurring Opinion 
 
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Thomas, focused on a 
theory he referred to as the “sue me approach” put forth by the United States 
as amicus curiae.202  He pointed to the United States’ argument that the 
government’s implicit promise to compensate a property owner for taking 
property would be sufficient if the owner was able to sue the government 
and win.203  Contrary to such argument, Justice Thomas noted the Fifth 
Amendment did not provide recourse only to property owners who were 
willing to go through the hassle of suing the government to obtain 
compensation.204  Rather, he stated the “sue me approach” could not be 
supported because the Fifth Amendment had a prerequisite which 
commanded just compensation be given to a property owner in order for 
the government to have authority to take property.205  Justice Thomas 
further alleged that a government’s refusal to compensate a property owner 
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agreed with the majority opinion that the injunction concerns argued by the 
United States were misplaced and moot.207  On the other hand, Justice 
Thomas believed that when the court determined a particular plaintiff was 
entitled to relief, that did not mean the challenged regulatory scheme as a 
whole would be enjoined or invalidated, but was actually evaluated on a 
case by case basis; thus implying completely overruling Williamson County 
may not have been necessary.208   
 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
 
1. Overruling Williamson County 
 
The dissent, written by Justice Kagan, took the stance that 
Williamson County was decided correctly, supported by precedent, and 
should not have been overruled.209  She interpreted the Williamson County 
decision as having ruled that a government was allowed to take property 
from an owner as long as there was a sufficient procedure to provide just 
compensation to the property owner, even if the actual payment transaction 
was not conducted until after the government had already committed the 
taking.210  Justice Kagan stated the majority’s decision disregarded 
Williamson County and many other prior decisions, based on the belief that 
it implied that any instance in which a government had taken property and 
had not compensated the owner in advance was a violation of the 
Constitution, regardless of whether the government had proven prior to the 
taking that it was able and dedicated to paying the owner after.211   
In support of her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan first referenced 
the words and meaning of the Taking Clause.212  Her interpretation was that 
the Takings Clause conferred the right to be free from the government 
taking property only when the government failed to pay the property owner 
just compensation.213  Therefore, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s 
implication that the Takings Clause gave property owners the right to be 
free from all property takings by the government.214  Justice Kagan argued 
the Takings Clause was different than other clauses in the Bill of Rights 
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private property for public use.215  She claimed that unlike other guarantees 
contained in the Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause did not make it unlawful 
for the government to take property, but rather allowed such takings as long 
as the government justly compensated the property owner.216   
The dissent further disagreed with the majority opinion on the 
elements required for a violation of the Takings Clause.217  Justice Kagan 
alleged there were two elements that must have been present before a 
violation had occurred: there must have been a taking of property by the 
government and the government must have refused to pay the owner just 
compensation.218  The dissenting opinion believed that until the government 
had withheld and denied payment, there was no constitutional violation.219   
Additionally, Justice Kagan claimed that the majority opinion 
dismantled the Court’s prior ruling regarding the threshold boundary that 
determined when the government’s action of withholding compensation 
resulted in a constitutional violation.220  In support of her argument, Justice 
Kagan relied on the case Cherokee Nation, also cited within the majority 
opinion.221  However, she emphasized the court in that decision held 
payment in advance of the taking was not a required stipulation in the 
Takings Clause, but rather, delayed payment was acceptable, conditioned 
on the government providing a tenable, definite and sufficient method for 
the owner to be given compensation.222  Justice Kagan argued that such 
ideas had been reiterated and followed for decades, yet were not followed 
in the majority opinion.223    
In examining Williamson County, the dissenting opinion argued the 
Court there followed the precedent set up by Cherokee Nation.224  Justice 
Kagan noted the state in that case, Tennessee, had implemented an inverse 




217. Id. The majority subsequently acknowledged the dissent’s argument in the 
instant case, in which the dissent put forth a defense that supported the original rationale 
behind Williamson County and claimed no violation of the Fifth Amendment existed, 
until a property owner was denied compensation. Majority stated that the dissent went 
beyond the respondent’s argument in the instant case and argued there was no support for 
the dissent’s view in any of the repeated Supreme Court holdings, which ruled just 
compensation was a constitutional right given to property owners that vested at the 
moment the taking occurred. Id. at 2174-75. (majority opinion). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 2181-82. 
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after a taking, but the builders chose to file action in federal court through 
the Takings Clause instead.225  She claimed the Williamson County Court 
found the Fifth Amendment only prohibited takings without just 
compensation, and that the Amendment only required the availability of a 
tenable, definite and sufficient procedure through which an owner can seek 
compensation.226  Justice Kagan further alleged that Court held that the 
inverse condemnation procedure was sufficient and the government did not 
actually deny compensation to the property owner until the state procedure 
was used and had not resulted in compensation.227  Therefore, she 
concluded the government had not violated the Takings Clause at the point 
the builder filed the federal action.228  The dissenting opinion argued the 
Williamson County decision had not resulted in any new rulings that could 
not be found in prior decisions, other than the Court ruling that the state 
implemented inverse condemnation procedure qualified as tenable and 
sufficient, and that the particular statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, required a 
property owner to unsuccessfully attempt the inverse condemnation 
procedure.229   
Justice Kagan insisted that contrary to majority opinion’s belief, 
repeated decisions held rejection of compensation was a second required 
element for a violation of the Takings Clause to arise.230  Overall, the 
dissent disagreed with the majority opinion’s decision to not follow 
Williamson County’s holding and stated in the process of ruling as such, it 
also disregarded and destroyed over a hundred years of precedent.231   
 
2. Stare Decisis  
 
The dissenting opinion also strongly believed stare decisis should 
have been followed.232  Justice Kagan listed four factors, different factors 
than those listed by the majority opinion, that she believed the majority 
opinion had used in overruling Williamson County, which included: 
comparing takings claims with other constitutional claims, interpreting the 
words of the Takings Clause, asserting a belief to not read precedent too 
broadly, and construing theories from prior decisions involving the Tucker 
Act.233   
 
225. Id. at 2182-83. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 2183.  
228. Id.   
229. Id.   
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 2190. 
233. Id. at 2183-84.  
150 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:1 
First, the dissent argued that the majority’s declaration that the Bill 
of Rights treated takings claims worse than the other claims it contained 
was without merit.234  Justice Kagan stated the Takings Clause 
distinguished two elements required for a claim in a similar manner to 
other Bill of Rights claims, meaning the clause was equivalent and did not 
treat takings plaintiffs any worse.235  Second, the dissenting opinion 
pointed to the text of the Takings Clause and argued that although it did 
not explicitly contain verbiage that specifically allowed subsequent 
payment when certain procedures existed, it also did not explicitly state 
advanced or immediate payment was required as the majority opinion 
suggested.236  Third, the dissent claimed that the courts in prior decisions 
did not intentionally focus on the type of relief sought, but rather the courts 
merely intended to convey that injunctions could not be granted because 
there were other procedures in place which provided monetary 
compensation and a plaintiff was required to seek compensatory damages 
first.237  
Fourth, Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority opinion’s ruling 
that takings claims were claims for Fifth Amendment violations, and 
argued such a ruling was based on the incorrect finding that advanced or 
contemporaneous payment was required.238  The dissent contended that 
since advanced payment was not required and takings claims could not be 
brought until payment was denied, takings claims in fact were not the 
same as claims for Fifth Amendment violations.239  Justice Kagan 
adamantly believed the majority opinion overruled years of precedent in 
the instant case, and alleged that when overruling such a substantial 
amount of precedent, the Court should have considered that its theory may 
not have been accurate.240   
The dissenting opinion also declared that majority’s decision will 
result in two other damaging consequences: it will turn innocent 
government officials into violators and it will undermine underlying 
principles of judicial federalism.241  Justice Kagan alleged that innocent 
officials would be violators since there was no longer a formula to predict 
when government actions would effect a taking and resulted in an inability 
to have advanced knowledge of a certain proposed program’s chance of 
 
234. Id. at 2184. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 2184-85.  
238. Id. at 2186.  
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 2186-87. 
241. Id. at 2187. 
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amounting to a taking.242  The dissent reasoned judicial federalism was 
undermined because the decision acted as a door into federal courts by 
giving federal courts jurisdiction over takings claims which Justice Kagan 
thought should be decided in state court.243  
Lastly, the dissenting opinion argued the preclusion trap issue 
considered by the majority opinion could have alternatively been corrected 
by Congress.244  As another alternative option, Justice Kagan argued that at 
any point, Congress could have implemented legislation that would allow a 
plaintiff to bring an action in federal court after an unsuccessful attempt in 
state court, and effectively reverse the preclusion trap problem.245  Justice 
Kagan alleged that previous Justices had stated the Court should not 
overrule precedent even in instances of serious error.246  Ultimately, the 
dissent’s argument was based on an opinion that stare decisis should have 
been strictly followed in the majority’s decision and Williamson County 
should not have been overruled.247  
 
V. ANALYSIS OF Knick v. Township of Scott 
 
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the Supreme Court took up an issue 
that had been addressed by a multitude of courts through varying and 
inconsistent methods and was in dire need of clarification. The outcome of 
the case hinged on the Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause and 
whether the just compensation provision was a general command or a 
required element of takings claim.  The majority opinion was correct in 
holding property owners with takings claims were not obligated to first 
pursue state remedies, though arriving at the correct conclusion was 
happenstance because the Court should have taken a formalistic approach 
in its analysis by classifying the exhaustion requirement as constitutional 
ripeness or prudential ripeness.  
 
A. Two Classifications Under the Ripeness Doctrine: Constitutional and 
Prudential 
 
Classifying ripeness and distinguishing between the categories of 
constitutional and prudential is important for selecting the type of analysis 




244. Id. at 2189. 
245. Id. at 2189-90. 
246. Id. at 2189. 
247. Id. at 2190. 
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County was an intricate case that had not explicitly categorized the type of 
state-litigation requirement it imposed.  As a result, there was a resounding 
difficulty throughout courts which attempted to interpret the opinion 
thereafter.  Williamson County articulated two rules allegedly linked to the 
Takings Clause: first, the finality prong requires a definitive conclusion 
stating a taking occurred; and second, the just compensation prong requires 
denial of compensation through state procedures.  However, it was not clear 
whether these two rules were derived from the language of the Fifth 
Amendment or based on policy considerations related to takings claims.  
If Williamson County surmised that the statutory language of the 
Fifth Amendment included the compensation exhaustion requirement, then 
the requirement would have been classified under constitutional ripeness. 
The ensuing impact would have meant litigants did not have a vested 
constitutional right to a federal takings claim until they pursued state 
procedures unsuccessfully.  One significance of classifying it as 
constitutional is that courts would not have authority to make exceptions to 
the state-law requirement.  
On the other hand, if justification for Williamson County’s 
requirement was based on policy considerations, it would have been 
classified as a prudential ripeness prong.  The significant difference in 
classifying the state-law requirement as prudential ripeness would have 
meant the requirement was non-jurisdictional, and therefore, courts would 
have been able to make exceptions and waive the exhaustion requirement.  
As explained supra, in the Patsy case decided three years prior to 
Williamson County, the Supreme Court had looked to the statutory language 
and congressional intent underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The Court 
determined the language of the statute did not explicitly command 
exhaustion of state procedures and found Congress had intended to protect 
citizens’ federal rights to constitutional claims and to ensure fairness 
throughout courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court had specifically declared 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not allow courts to impose exhaustion 
requirements. Yet, this was exactly what the Williamson County Court had 
done, completely disregarding its ruling from only three years prior.  
Post-Williamson County, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South 
Carolina had classified the exhaustion requirement as a prudential ripeness 
factor. However, the Court there had not explained its rationale or 
justification for labeling as prudential ripeness.  Then in Suitum, the Court 
had done the same thing and referred to the Williamson County 
requirements as “prudential hurdles” but gave little indication as to why it 
had chosen that description.  A few years later, the Court’s opinion in San 
Remo then lacked any reference to whether the Williamson County 
exhaustion requirement was a constitutional or prudential ripeness factor. 
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in San Remo had 
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pointed out the lack of discussion on ripeness by the majority and noted his 
concern that the ripeness doctrine as applied to Williamson County had 
created issues.  After San Remo, the Court in Stop the Beach made the 
distinction that the Williamson County requirement was non-jurisdictional, 
which indicated prudential ripeness.  Lastly, in Horne, the Court reiterated 
its belief that the exhaustion requirement was prudential and non-
jurisdictional.  
Overall, by the time Knick arrived before the Supreme Court thirty-
four (34) years after Williamson County was handed down, the exhaustion 
requirement that was presumably derived from language in the Fifth 
Amendment had mysteriously evolved into a prudential ripeness prong. 
This begged the question: which classification was proper and how should 
Williamson County be handled going forward? 
 
B. Unclassified Exhaustion Requirement and the Resulting Convoluted 
Opinion 
 
In Knick, the majority opinion’s failure to classify or interpret 
Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement led to a convoluted and 
contradictory discussion.  The Court posed the issue in two parts: one part 
looked at what was required for a claim based on a violation of the Takings 
Clause, and the other part assessed whether to overrule Williamson County 
or follow the principals of stare decisis. 
The first part alluded to the exhaustion requirement of Williamson 
County, and led the Court to analyze the underlying basis of the 
requirement.  It was at this point that the Court should have begun its 
discussion with ripeness classification in order to determine the appropriate 
analysis. Instead, the majority opinion jumped right into its arguments, and 
did so in an unmethodical and arbitrary manner.  The only statement 
regarding ripeness that the majority opinion made was deep within its 
discussion and said “We eventually abandoned the view that the 
requirement is an element of a takings claim and recast it as a ‘prudential’ 
ripeness rule… No party defends that approach here.”  That statement 
indicates first, that the Court had initially regarded Williamson County’s 
exhaustion requirement as a constitutional ripeness prong; and second, that 
the Court may not have been convinced it was prudential, but the Court did 
not elaborate any further.  Consequently, the majority opinion lacked 
direction and improperly addressed a combination of principles from both 
constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness.  
Prudential ripeness factors emerge from the majority opinion’s 
ultimate conclusions that “the state-litigation requirement imposes an 
unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our 
takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled;” and “[f]idelity to the 
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Takings Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson 
County and restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status 
the Framers envisioned when they included the Clause.”  Each of these 
statements are focused on policy considerations such as fairness, justice, 
efficiency, and loyalty.  
On the other hand, the majority opinion also supported its decision 
with references to the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause, and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  The Court examined the three statutes and determined whether 
statutory language and/or legislative intent underlying each statute required 
exhaustion of state remedies.  Applying these principles is directly in-line 
with constitutional ripeness predicated on commands of the Fifth 
Amendment.  
Looking at the majority opinion in its entirety, it conflates the 
doctrines of constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness by using 
constitutional factors to support a prudential-based holding, but a rule 
cannot be both.  The Knick majority opinion conducted an improper 
analysis which could have led to an inappropriate, invalid, and potentially 
unconstitutional ruling, though luckily it did not in the instant case.  
Furthermore, the impact of Knick could be problematic for future 
courts attempting to understand and interpret its holding, in search of 
justification and direction on how to apply its rule going forward; especially 
considering it overturned such a long-standing rule. 
 
C. Proper Classification of the Exhaustion Requirement as a 
Constitutional Command 
 
For a more proper and legally sound conclusion, the majority 
opinion should have focused its analysis on formalistic principles within the 
ripeness doctrine.  More specifically, it should have classified the 
exhaustion requirement under constitutional ripeness and used the 
respective principles, as indicated by four factors arising from case 
precedent.  First, the fact that the Court acknowledged the requirement had 
been “recast” as prudential shows the Court originally perceived it as 
constitutional ripeness.  Second, the structure of the Court’s analysis in 
Williamson County is rooted in constitutional command principles.  Third, 
San Remo precedent cited within Knick implied principals of constitutional 
ripeness.  If the proper classification of ripeness had been applied, that being 
constitutional ripeness, the analysis that followed would have shown that 
Williamson County’s requirement inhibited plaintiff’s constitutional rights 
and necessitated overruling. 
In majority’s discussion, it implied the exhaustion requirement was 
constitutionally commanded ripeness originally, and that court opinions 
have caused the requirement to evolve into prudential ripeness.  While that 
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may have been true, the majority opinion did not support such conjecture 
with reasons that warranted reclassification of the requirement.  Moreover, 
the cases that have referred to Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement 
as prudential have failed to justify their doing so and have been 
foundationless conjectures.  Therefore, there was no basis for the ripeness 
classification to evolve.  
Next, the details of the Court’s discussion in Williamson County 
were centered around its interpretations of the Fifth Amendment.  It 
addressed whether the statutory language of the Takings Clause required 
just compensation and at what point the clause mandated compensation be 
given.  It then tied the commands from the Takings Clause to the 
deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concluded that a takings 
plaintiff was not deprived of a right within the meaning of the statutes until 
they had been deprived of compensation.  These factors are situated within 
the principles of constitutional command ripeness, and thus, lead to the 
conclusion that the exhaustion requirement as imposed by Williamson 
County was a constitutional ripeness requirement.  
Lastly, San Remo indicated exhaustion was a constitutional ripeness 
requirement through its preclusion trap problem.  When the Court found 
that Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement prevented the San Remo 
plaintiff from pursuing a subsequent federal claim on the grounds of issue 
preclusion and plaintiff asked for an exception to be made, the Court held 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not permit exceptions in such a 
situation.  Since prudential ripeness allowed exceptions and constitutional 
ripeness did not, the Court inadvertently asserted that the requirement was 
a constitutional commanded ripeness prong.248  
Consideration of each of these facts indicates Williamson County’s 
exhaustion requirement is more properly interpreted to fall under the 
classification of constitutional command ripeness rather than prudential 
ripeness.  As such, the correct analysis for the Court to determine whether 
exhaustion of state procedures was actually required would have been based 
on only the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
More specifically, the Patsy Court for instance, referenced a two-part test 
that looked first at the statutory language and then at congressional intent 
and legislative history underlying the statute.  Application of that test to the 
facts of the instant case would have led to the conclusion that Williamson 
 
248. Then, the Court in Chicago created a conflict when it indicated on one 
hand that the requirement was jurisdictional despite the cases before it that stated the 
exhaustion requirement was non-jurisdictional, but on the other hand that it was allowed 
to waive the requirements. Holding the requirement as jurisdictional would mean the 
requirement was constitutional command ripeness yet allowing waiver would mean 
exceptions were allowed and that it was prudential ripeness.  
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County’s exhaustion requirement was not permitted and was 
unconstitutional because it deprived property owners of their constitutional 
right to bring a federal claim and to pursue their constitutionally granted 
right to just compensation for a taking.  From this conclusion, the Court 
then should have answered the stare decisis question in part two.  In light 
of the constitutional rights jeopardized here, the Court should have found 
the potential deprivation of constitutional rights outweighed any entitlement 
to stare decisis that Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement might 
have had, whether “enhanced” or not.  Therefore, it was proper to overrule 




The Supreme Court imposed a rule in Williamson County that 
required property owners with Fifth Amendment takings claims to first 
exhaust state procedures for compensation unsuccessfully, before they were 
permitted to file a claim for compensation in federal court.  The question of 
whether to overrule Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement was 
frequently avoided until the Supreme Court decision in Knick v. Township 
of Scott.  Ultimately, the Knick majority opinion properly concluded that 
Williamson County’s requirement prevented full exercise of the 
constitutional right to compensation granted to property owners by the Fifth 
Amendment and had resulted in a grave error that necessitated prompt 
correction. 
However, the Court’s opinion not only failed to apply the proper 
test and instead applied an informal method of factors, but it also 
improperly used a combination of constitutional and prudential ripeness 
principles when it should have only applied constitutional ripeness 
principles.  Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement was formed 
without authority, against legal precedent, and resulted in unconstitutional 
effects.  Upholding Williamson County would have been unjust and the only 
guaranteed option to promptly correct those problems within the Supreme 
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